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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants ("SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT")1 is a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken 
under Utah R. App. P. 3(a). The Utah Supreme Court had original 
appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under Section 78-2-2(3)(j), 
Utah Code. Pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code, the Supreme 
Court transferred this appeal to the Court of Appeals, which now 
has jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The only issue properly presented for review is whether 
the trial court erred in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION") dated February 
27, 1997. R. 473-475. The standard of appellate review for this 
issue is accurately stated in Brief of Appellant ("RORY'S 
BRIEF"), p. 2, as being a review for correctness. 
For the reasons set forth in Appellees' Motion to 
Dismiss Parts of Appellant's Appeal2 dated December 18, 1997, the 
xThe document, R. 884-892, which contains the SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, R. 887-888, was signed by Bryce K. Bryner, District 
Judge, on October 29, 1997, and entered on October 30, 1997. The 
document also contains Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment ("ORDER DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MOTION") R. 888-890; Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Leave 
to File an Amended Complaint ("ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND") R. 
890-891; and Order Denying Motion to Strike Affidavit of Lyman 
Grover ("ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT") R. 891-892. 
2The Utah Supreme Court deferred ruling on this motion by 
order dated January 5, 1998. 
1 
denial by the trial court of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (»RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION"), R. 204-205, 
is not a final, appealable order and there is no standard of 
appellate review. Likewise the denial of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Leave to File an Amended Complaint ("MOTION TO AMEND"), R. 687-
688, dated March 6, 1997, is not a final order. However, should 
this court consider the denial of the MOTION TO AMEND in deciding 
whether the trial court correctly entered the SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
the standard of review, as set forth in RORY'S BRIEF, p. 2, is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion. The other issues 
mentioned in RORY'S BRIEF, p. 1, are not separate appealable 
issues.3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
A. The pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution is as follows: " . . . [N]or shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law. . . ." U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1. 
3These other issues are: Impartiality of the 
disciplinarian; vague and ambiguous policies; and deprival of 
liberty interest. RORY'S BRIEF makes no other mention of or 
argument concerning the liberty interest issue. In any event, 
the due process required is the same irrespective of whether a 
property or a liberty interest is involved. Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565, 572 (1975). While RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 1-2, does not 
assert that the validity of the ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT is one of the issues, RORY's Notice of Appeal dated 
November 24, 1997 does state that an appeal is taken from that 
order. R. 903-904. DISTRICT also asserts this order is not final 
and appealable. 
2 
B. The pertinent part of U.R.C.P. 56 (1998) is: "The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." 
C. The pertinent part of U.R.C.P. 15 (1998) is: 
(a) Amendments . . . . [A] party may amend 
his pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party . . . . 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. 
D. The pertinent part of Utah R. App. P. 24 (1998) 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented 
for review, including for each issue: the standard 
of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
. . . (B) a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of an issue not presented in the trial 
court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case involves a ten day suspension of a student 
for use of marijuana during a school activity. The trial court 
concluded Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), is determinative 
and the due process requirements of Goss were satisfied by the 
undisputed facts showing that the student " . . . was given notice 
3 
of the charges and evidence against him and an opportunity to 
present his side of the story in an informal setting." SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, R. 8 87. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
1. Plaintiff (Appellant) Rory J. Atcitty 
("RORY"), acting through his natural parent, Roger Atcitty 
("ROGER"), filed the Complaint ("COMPLAINT") on May 17, 1996. R. 
1-5. The sole claim (the "ORIGINAL CLAIM") was, that in 
suspending RORY for ten days without providing the hearing to 
which RORY claims he was entitled, Defendants (Appellees) Board 
of Education of the San Juan County School District ("BOARD") and 
Lyman Grover ("GROVER") (BOARD and GROVER are collectively 
"DISTRICT") deprived RORY of his property right to an education 
in violation of the due process provisions of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.4 
4H 9 of the COMPLAINT, p. 3, reads: 
"9. At the time of and prior to the expulsion, Defendants 
failed to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to present a 
defense to the charges, failed to afford Plaintiff and his 
parents a due process hearing or procedure to contest the 
expulsion by presenting evidence and confronting the child's 
accusers, and refused the parents' request to reinstate the child 
in school pending such a hearing. Defendants further denied 
Plaintiff the right .to present circumstances in mitigation of the 
harsh penalty imposed by the expulsion. The expulsion 
effectively terminates the child's right to participate in honors 
and other end-of-the-year activities and deprives him of the free 
appropriate public education to which he is entitled from the 
District." R. 3. 
H 11 of the COMPLAINT, p. 3, reads: 
"11. Plaintiff is entitled to a due process hearing 
concerning his expulsion. Defendants' denial of the right to a 
due process hearing constitutes a denial of procedural due 
4 
COMPLAINT makes no claim GROVER was partial, BOARD policies were 
vague and ambiguous, DISTRICT violated state statutes in failing 
to adopt proper policies or to provide home schooling during the 
suspension period, or RORY was deprived of a liberty interest 
(the foregoing are collectively the "NEW CLAIMS"). 
2. A scheduling and management conference was 
held on August 27, 1996, resulting in the entry of the Scheduling 
and Management Order ("SCHEDULING ORDER") dated August 30, 1996, 
which provided discovery would be completed by December 27, 1996; 
dispositive motions would be filed on or before January 31, 1997; 
and trial would commence on March 18, 1997. R. 159-160. On 
motion of RORY, the Amended Scheduling and Management Order was 
entered on February 20, 1997, which extended the date for filing 
dispositive motions and reset the trial for May 28, 1998. R. 
process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution." R. 3. 
The pertinent parts of ff 14 and 15 of the COMPLAINT, p. 4, 
are : 
"14. Plaintiff is entitled to a . . . permanent injunction 
against the Defendants enjoining from excluding him from school 
and school activities without first complying with appropriate 
due process procedures. Plaintiff is entitled to this remedy 
because (1) he has suffered irreparable injury by not being 
afforded the right to go to school, receive an adequate 
education, and participate in other educational activities . . 
. . " R. 4 . 
"15. Plaintiff is further entitled to a declaratory judgment 
that the Defendants have violated the constitutional provisions 
in the manner alleged herein." R. 4. 
% 1 in the prayer on p. 5 of the COMPLAINT reads: 
"1. Declare and determine that the Defendants are in 
violation of the constitutional provisions alleged herein." R. 
5. 
5 
422-424. 
3. Discovery was completed as follows: 
a. DISTRICT took the depositions of RORY 
and ROGER on July 19, 1996 and RORY took the deposition of GROVER 
on December 17, 1996. R. 939 at p. 1, 940 at p. 1, 941 at p. 1. 
b. Protective Order No. 1 ("PROTECTIVE 
ORDER NO. 1") was entered on September 26, 1996. R. 163-170. 
c. All required documents were made 
available by DISTRICT to RORY on or before October 16, 1996. 
Certificate of Service of Plaintiff's First Request for 
Documents, R. 52; Defendants' Response to First Requests for 
Documents, R. 84; PROTECTIVE ORDER NO. 1, R. 163-170; Certificate 
with Respect to Documents Requested in Request No. 2 of 
Plaintiff's First Requests for Documents, R. 181-182. See 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Leave to File an Amended Complaint ("DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING 
MOTION TO AMEND"), R. 758-759; Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("RORY'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MEMO"), R. 219. 
4. On February 14, 1997, RORY filed RORY'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, R. 2 04, and RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMO, R. 2 06, in which RORY asserted, for the first time the NEW 
6 
CLAIMS,5 R. 219-220, 226-230, other than the claim DISTRICT had 
failed to provide required home schooling during the suspension 
period ("HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM").6 
5. On February 27, 1997, DISTRICT'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTION, Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO"), and 
Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment ("DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING RORY'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT") were filed. R. 473, 476, 581. The latter 
document pointed out that the NEW CLAIMS raised in RORY'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MEMO had not been pleaded. R. 591-593. 
6. On March 6, 1997, RORY filed MOTION TO AMEND 
seeking leave to file a First Amended Complaint, pleading for the 
first time, the NEW CLAIMS, other than the HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM. 
5Up to this time the parties and the court proceeded as if 
ORIGINAL CLAIM was the only issue in this lawsuit. See supra % 
B.l, pp. 4-5; Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, R. 15-21, (RORY 
alleges he was suspended without due process when he was "never 
afforded even a minimal right such as a right to have the 
opportunity to rebut allegations prior to the decision of the 
suspension," and "he was not given the opportunity to present his 
side of the story . . ..") R. 16-17; Defendants' Reply to 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Protective Order (stating "this case focuses solely on whether 
the District provided the Plaintiff with the process due him 
under the law in connection with the disciplinary action taken") 
(emphasis original) R. 130-131. 
6The HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM was not made at all by RORY in the 
lower court and is asserted for the first time on appeal. RORY'S 
BRIEF, pp. 26-27. 
7 
R. 687-688, 818-823. 
7. On March 17, 1997, RORY moved to strike 
GROVER AFFIDAVIT. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Lyman Grover Submitted in Support of Defendants' Summary Judgment 
Motion and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT"). R. 722-723. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
On October 30, 1997, the SUMMARY JUDGMENT (which 
determined RORY had no cause of action against DISTRICT and 
dismissed the COMPLAINT with prejudice) R. 887-888, the ORDER 
DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (which denied RORY'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION) R. 888-890, the ORDER DENYING RORY'S 
MOTION TO AMEND (which denied MOTION TO AMEND) R. 890-891, and 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT (which denied the MOTION 
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT) R. 891-892, were entered. R. 884.7 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Since the central question is whether the undisputed 
facts show RORY was afforded the hearing required by Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) the critical facts are those which 
7The grounds for the above judgment and orders, as well as 
the reasoning of the trial court, are set forth in the judgment 
and orders (R. 884-892) as well as in Ruling on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 804-807); Ruling on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 814-816) ; Ruling on 
Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (R. 811-813) ; 
Ruling on Motion to Strike Affidavit of Lyman Grover (R. 808-
810); and Ruling on Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Summary 
Judgment Order (R. 880-882). 
8 
show what transpired between GROVER and RORY. The Statement of 
Facts on pp. 5-11 of RORY'S BRIEF does not address what happened, 
but rather focuses on what RORY claims should have taken place. 
To show what actually occurred, DISTRICT submits there is no 
genuine issue as to the following material facts: 
1. RORY was a student at Whitehorse High School 
("SCHOOL") which was administered by BOARD with GROVER as the 
Principal. COMPLAINT, KK 1, 2, 3, R. 1-2; Answer dated May 31, 
1996, % I.A., R. 46-47; Affidavit of Lyman Grover ("GROVER 
AFFIDAVIT"), i[ 2, R. 433-434. 
2. On or about May 4, 1996, RORY and other 
members of the SCHOOL band traveled to Durango, Colorado ("BAND 
TRIP"). Deposition of Rory Atcitty ("RORY DEPOSITION"), R. 941 
at pp. 5-6. 
3. On Friday, May 10, 1996, Liz Sharpe 
("SHARPE"), the Assistant Principal at SCHOOL, informed GROVER of 
an incident of marijuana smoking (the "INCIDENT") on the BAND 
TRIP. Because GROVER was not then available, it was decided to 
begin an investigation on Monday, May 13, 1996. Deposition of 
Lyman Grover ("GROVER DEPOSITION"), R. 940 at pp. 7-9; GROVER 
AFFIDAVIT, f 3, R. 434. 
4. On May 13 the following occurred: 
a. Lena Begay, the parenting specialist, 
identified RORY and other students as being involved in the 
9 
INCIDENT. GROVER began an investigation, calling in the students 
"to ask them to tell their side of the story." GROVER 
DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 9-12. 
b. GROVER telephoned ROGER and requested 
that he come to SCHOOL to discuss a matter "involving [his] son, 
Rory". ROGER asked, "Can you just tell me what the problem is?" 
GROVER responded, "This is dealing with marijuana." GROVER 
DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 12-13; Deposition of Roger Atcitty 
("ROGER DEPOSITION"), R. 939 at pp. 4-6; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 4.b, 
R. 434. 
c. Later, ROGER contacted SCHOOL and 
requested that he be allowed to talk with RORY prior to meeting 
with GROVER. Upon arrival, ROGER informed RORY of the 
allegations involving marijuana against him. In addition, ROGER 
told RORY, "It's a serious charge . . . From now on - - I want 
you to just not answer any questions from now on or until you get 
approval from me . . .." ROGER DEPOSITION, R. 939 at pp. 6-8; 
RORY DEPOSITION, R. 941 at pp. 25-27; GROVER DEPOSITION, pp. 13-
15, 23. 
d. ROGER and his wife met with GROVER and 
SHARPE. GROVER informed ROGER his investigation indicated RORY 
was involved in "distributing marijuana at the school and during 
school activities". ROGER told GROVER that "with the seriousness 
of the charges allegated (sic) against [RORY], I instructed . . . 
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[RORY] not to answer any more questions from hereon out." ROGER 
indicated he had talked to his attorney, and inquired as to the 
source of the information implicating RORY. ROGER was told the 
sources were the other students involved, and some parents, 
including Lena Begay. ROGER questioned the allegations, 
indicated the report from Lena Begay was politically motivated, 
the allegations were hearsay and GROVER had no proof RORY had 
been involved. ROGER DEPOSITION, R. 93 9 at p. 7; GROVER 
DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 15-16, 18, 20, 23; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 
4.d., R. 434. 
5. On May 14, 1996, the following occurred: 
a. GROVER obtained written statements from 
each of the students, except RORY, involved in the INCIDENT. 
GROVER attempted to talk with RORY and asked RORY to make a 
written statement about the INCIDENT. RORY refused to answer any 
questions because "my father told me not to tell you anything." 
GROVER repeatedly requested that RORY tell what happened. RORY 
refused, stating his dad told him not to say anything. RORY 
asked and was permitted to call his father. In this telephone 
conversation ROGER told RORY, "'until I get there, don't answer 
any questions.'" GROVER DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 22-25; RORY 
DEPOSITION, R. 941 at pp. 29-32; ROGER DEPOSITION, R. 939 at 9; 
GROVER AFFIDAVIT, ff 5.a., 5.b., R. 434-435. 
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b. Upon arrival, ROGER, RORY, GROVER and 
SHARPE met in GROVER's office. GROVER again informed ROGER and 
RORY of the marijuana allegations against RORY and the evidence 
came from the others involved. ROGER stated he had instructed 
RORY not to answer any questions because of the seriousness of 
the allegations and that if the investigation by GROVER was to 
clear RORY's name, RORY would give a statement with names of the 
others involved. Otherwise, ROGER would proceed with the 
lawsuit. GROVER indicated he would continue his investigation. 
ROGER DEPOSITION, R. 939 at p. 9; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, K 5.C., R. 
434-435. 
6. On May 16, 1996, the following occurred: 
a. GROVER determined, based on his 
investigation, that four students (including RORY) smoked 
marijuana on the BAND TRIP and should be suspended for ten days. 
GROVER gathered to his office RORY and the other available, 
involved students. Davis Fillfred ("FILLFRED"), a Navajo Police 
Officer (who had been notified by GROVER), was also present. 
GROVER informed the students that based on investigation, 
interviews and written statements, he had determined that four of 
the students, including RORY, had used marijuana on the BAND TRIP 
and would be suspended for ten days. GROVER explained the terms 
of the suspension. GROVER told the students that FILLFRED was 
present because their acts constituted criminal conduct and he 
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was obligated to inform the police. FILLFRED told the students 
they were accused of using drugs and questioned them. He asked 
one of the students where he had gotten the marijuana and the 
student indicated it came from RORY. RORY responded, ". . . 1 
never had it." This was the first time GROVER heard RORY deny 
any of the allegations. Prior to this time, when GROVER 
attempted to talk to him, RORY always refused to speak, neither 
admitting or denying, except to indicate ROGER had told him not 
to answer any questions. GROVER DEPOSITION, R. 94 0 at pp. 3 0-38, 
43-44; RORY DEPOSITION, R. 941 at pp. 35-40; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, Uf 
6, 9, R. 435-437. 
b. FILLFRED left. GROVER contacted ROGER 
and informed him RORY had been suspended and ROGER needed to come 
and get RORY. When ROGER and his wife arrived, GROVER invited 
them and RORY into his office to explain the terms of the 
suspension and how it could be shortened by participation in a 
drug rehabilitation program. Rejecting the invitation, ROGER 
stated he was only there to pick up RORY and sign any necessary 
papers. Again GROVER invited them into his office to discuss the 
suspension and again they refused. GROVER provided ROGER with 
the Student Behavior Referral8 and again tried to explain to RORY 
and his parents the terms of the suspension. ROGER said, "[H]e 
didn't want to hear all that; that he just wanted to pick up his 
This document can be found at R. 42 0 and 576. 
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son and go home and [GROVER would] be hearing from his attorney." 
RORY and his parents left. GROVER DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 39-
42; ROGER DEPOSITION, R. 939 at pp. 10-13; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, %<h 
12-13, R. 437-438. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly granted DISTRICT'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTION and denied RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. The 
controlling authority is Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) and 
its progeny. The due process required, in the context of a 
suspension of ten days or less, is notice of the charge, 
explanation of the evidence if the charge is denied, and 
opportunity to be heard, all with a minimum of formality. These 
requirements were satisfied in this case. RORY pays lip service 
to Goss and ignores its progeny. RORY urges the court to apply 
another and more exacting standard. RORY's arguments the 
DISTRICT'S policies are vague and ambiguous in noncompliance of 
state law; GROVER was biased because he acted in some law 
enforcement capacity; failure to provide home-schooling services 
tainted the hearing process; and affected liberty interests 
require additional due process must be rejected because they are 
raised improperly. These arguments should also be rejected 
because RORY has not established facts to support them and the 
law does not recognize such due process requirements in the 
context of suspension of ten days or less. RORY's arguments he 
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was not provided sufficient opportunities to be heard either as 
to the misconduct or in mitigation of punishment are without 
merit. RORY was provided several opportunities to be heard; he 
waived or failed to take advantage of any of them when he refused 
to talk to GROVER about the INCIDENT. Finally, RORY's suggestion 
that additional procedures were due in this case is not supported 
by the facts of record and case law directly on point. 
The trial court correctly denied the MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT. There is no inconsistency between the GROVER 
AFFIDAVIT and the GROVER DEPOSITION with respect to the alleged 
dual role of GROVER, and the meetings between RORY, ROGER and 
GROVER on May 16, 1996. 
The trial court did not abuse it's discretion in 
denying the MOTION TO AMEND. The MOTION TO AMEND sought to 
expand the issues in this case in an untimely matter which would 
have caused great prejudice to the DISTRICT. 
ARGUMENT 
RORY's sole claim is he was not provided due process 
with respect to his ten day suspension for use of marijuana on 
the BAND TRIP.9 This court must address two questions. First, 
what due process is required. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
481 (1972); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577 (1975). Second, was 
the required due process provided. 
9See the definition of ORIGINAL CLAIM, supra, p. 4. 
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I. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUSPENSION OF 
TEN DAYS OR LESS ARE LIMITED. 
Both parties agree the seminal case on due process 
associated with student suspension of ten days or less is Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) .10 In Goss, several Ohio high school 
students, who were suspended for up to ten days without a 
hearing, sued school officials, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
violating their constitutional due process rights. For the first 
time, in Goss, the United States Supreme Court addressed "short 
suspensions, not exceeding 10 days." Goss at 584. Goss is still 
the law today and state appellate courts, as well as lower 
federal courts have, without exception, applied the holding and 
rationale of Goss to all suspensions of ten days or less. Smith 
v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 1997); Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 
F.3d 383 (11th Cir. 1996); Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14 (1st 
Cir. 1995); Paredes by Koppenhoffer v. Curtis, 864 F.2d 426 (6th 
Cir. 1988); Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit School District No. 
2., 826 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1987); Arrington v. Ebberhart, 920 F. 
Supp. 1208 (M.D. Alabama 1996); Heller v. Hodgin, 928 F. Supp. 
789 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Bonner v. Lincoln Parish School Board, 685 
So.2d 432 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1996); Miller v. Board of Education of 
Caroline County, 690 A.2d 557 (Md. App. 1997); Byrd v. Irmo High 
School, 468 S.E.2d 861 (S.C. 1996); Wood v. Henry Public Schools, 
See RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 2-3. 
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495 S.E.2d 255 (Va. 1998). 
Goss made it clear the due process requirements to 
suspend a student for ten days are very limited.11 "The 
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to 
be heard." Goss, 419 U.S. at 579 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 
U.S. 385 (1914) . The Court held that in connection with a 
suspension of ten days or less, "due process requires ... that 
the student be given oral or written notice of the charges 
against him, and if he denies them, an explanation of the 
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his 
side of the story. " .Id. at 581 (emphasis added) . 
The notice of charges can be oral or written. Id.; 
Breeding, 82 F.2d at 386 (telephone call satisfied the 
requirements of the due process clause); Donovan, 68 F.3d. at 17; 
Arrington, 920 F. Supp. at 1217; Smith, 129 F.3d at 428; Heller, 
928 F. Supp. at 795; Bonner, 658 So.2d at 435; Byrd, 468 S.E.2d 
at 867-868. 
The required explanation is just an explanation and 
nothing more. Heller, 928 F. Supp. at 793, 795 (mother of 
student was told by teacher that teacher had heard student utter 
1:LThe court reiterated its prior admonition that "public 
education ... is committed to the control of state and local 
authorities." Goss, 419 U.S. at 578 (citing Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)). Deference is traditionally 
afforded by the courts to those administering the public 
education system. See, Miller, 690 A.2d at 559, 561. 
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the obscene epithet - the charge giving rise to the suspension); 
Breeding, 82 F.3d at 386 (school administrator only need to tell 
a student what they heard or saw). 
The opportunity is informal. Opportunity for the 
student to tell his side of the story is all that is needed. 
Goss, 419 U.S. at 583. In "the great majority of cases the 
disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with 
the student minutes after it has occurred." .Id. at 582. Indeed, 
the court characterized the required due process in one part of 
the opinion as "an informal give-and-take between student and 
disciplinarian." Id. at 584. The student is not entitled "to 
secure counsel, confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting 
the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of 
the incident". Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; Bonner, 685 S.2d at 434-
435. The student is not entitled to know the identity of and 
confront his accusers, or written statements of informants. 
Paredes# 864 F.2d at 429; Bonner, 685 So.2d at 434-435. "There 
need be no delay between the time notice is given and the time of 
the hearing." Goss 419 U.S. at 582; Breeding, 82 F.3d at 386 
("The dictates of Goss are clear and extremely limited. Briefly 
stated, once school administrators tell a student what they heard 
or saw, ask why they heard or saw it, and allow a brief response, 
a student has received all the process that the Fourteenth 
Amendment demands."); Smith, 129 F.3d at 428; Byrd, 468 S.E.2d at 
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867-866. The opportunity to be heard satisfies Goss even if 
provided after the suspension decision is made and before the 
suspension takes effect. Heller, 928 F. Supp. at 795. 
Courts have determined the Goss standards apply to 
alcohol and drug possession and/or use cases. Paredes, 864 F.2d 
426; Arrinqton, 920 F. Supp. 1208; Bonner, 685 So.2d 432; Miller, 
690 A.2d 557; Byrd, 468 S.E.2d 861. In Arrinqton, school 
officials received a report from another student that plaintiff 
possessed marijuana. Plaintiff was taken to the principal's 
office and informed of the accusations against him and read his 
juvenile rights by the sheriff deputy on duty at the school. The 
plaintiff declined to make any statement and requested his 
parents be contacted. The father came to school and checked the 
plaintiff out of school. The same day, by letter, the principal 
suspended plaintiff for 10 days. The court determined the Goss 
standard of due process applied and stated: 
Plaintiff was given an opportunity to make any 
statement that he wished to make in his own defense 
but he declined that opportunity. Hence not only 
did the plaintiff have notice of the charges against 
him he was also afforded an opportunity to present 
his version of the facts before he was suspended 
from school. As a result the court concludes that 
the defendants have complied with the due process 
requirements for short term suspension as set forth 
in Goss. 
Arrinqton, 920 F. Supp. at 1217. 
The Goss standards also apply to missing final exams 
and year-end activities, Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit School 
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District No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1987), and social 
events and interscholastic athletics. Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 
F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995). 
DISTRICT has not found a case since Goss, dealing with 
a ten day or less suspension and where a student was given any 
kind of opportunity to state his position, in which the court did 
not find the Goss requirements were met. RORY does not cite any 
case holding due process was not provided. It appears any sort 
of meeting between student and disciplinarian, where the student 
has an opportunity to speak, will suffice. 
II. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL 
FACT AND THOSE FACTS SHOW THAT THE DISTRICT 
COMPLIED WITH THE GOSS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS. 
RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 38-45, asserts that there are 
disputed issues of material fact. A careful reading, however, 
reveals RORY does not dispute any of the facts set forth herein. 
See supra, pp. 8-13.12 There is no hint RORY controverts the 
following ultimate facts: 
A. On May 13, 1996, RORY and ROGER knew RORY was 
charged with the possession and/or distribution of marijuana on 
the BAND TRIP. Even though they could have done so, RORY and 
ROGER refused to talk to GROVER about the charge, thus not 
denying the same and thus rejecting the opportunity to give 
12RORY could hardly do otherwise because the key facts set 
forth herein with respect to notice and opportunity come from the 
depositions of ROGER and RORY. 
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GROVER RORY's side of the story. See supra, pp. 9-11. 
B> ^gaj_n o n May 14 f 1996, essentially the same 
thing occurred again. This time, however, GROVER talked with 
RORY himself and requested RORY make a statement about the 
INCIDENT and, even though RORY had not yet denied the charges so 
as to give rise to an obligation on the part of GROVER to explain 
the evidence, GROVER provided an explanation by telling RORY the 
evidence came from 1 -<• other students :i nvc 1 ved. As was the case 
on May 13, RORY expressly refused to make a statement. See 
supra, pp. 11-12. 
C. Lastly, ' • same thing 
happened a third time except RORY denied the charge after one of 
the other students named him as the provider of the marijuana. 
RORY refused anything else about the matte:, See supra, 
pp. 12-14. 
RORY's argument there are disputed issues of material 
fact does not challenge the above, >-•• --v- argues there are 
disputed issues of fact involving RORY's right to be heard in 
mitigation of punishment; whether GROVER was an impartial 
disciplinarian; whether RORY 1 i. a.c:i notice c f 11 le :i : i i] es a i id 
procedures and time and place of hearing; and with respect to the 
GROVER AFFIDAVIT. See RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 38-45. 
RORY contends ENHANCED DUE PROCESS (defined 
hereinafter), See infra, pp. 23-24, must be provided to comply 
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with the law. RORY»S BRIEF, 5-11, 38-45; Plaintiff's Response 
Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion ("RORY'S 
MEMO OPPOSING DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT"), %% 2-7, 11, pp. 1-7, 
R. 697-703. Compliance with the law is to be determined by the 
court from what actually occurred; that is, by what was said and 
what was done. Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P.2d 
568, 571 (Utah App. 1992); Provo City Corp. v. Werner, 810 P.2d 
469, 471 (Utah App. 1991) . The parties do not agree on the 
outcome of this case because the parties dispute what the 
applicable law requires, not because they dispute what was said 
and done. 
There is no genuine issue that RORY and ROGER were 
given the required notice of the allegations, explanation of the 
evidence and opportunity to be heard on May 13, 1996, again on 
May 14, 1996, and lastly on May 16, 1996. RORY, acting under 
direction of his father and perhaps mistakenly believing he was 
entitled to something more, declined to avail himself of the 
opportunity to be heard. Due process only required DISTRICT to 
provide an opportunity for RORY to be heard, it does not, nor can 
it, mandate RORY to avail himself of the opportunity. Arrington, 
920 F. Supp. at 1217. 
III. RORY'S CLAIMS TO ENHANCED DUE PROCESS ARE 
WITHOUT MERIT. 
DISTRICT now turns to respond to the main thrust of 
RORY's argument, namely that due process over and above that 
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required by Goss was necessary in this case. RORY's definition 
of enhanced due process ("ENHANCED DUE PROCESS") includes: 1) 
timely and adequate notice of when the opportunity to be heard 
would be given, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 18, 22, 33, 38, 43; 2) notice 
which would alert RORY allegations against him, RORY'S 
BRIEF, p. 16; 3) notice which would alert RORY of his suspension, 
RORY'S BRIEF, pp. _, __, 19-20; 4) explanation of disciplinary 
process including suspension procedures hearing procedures, 
RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 8-9, 16, 18, 20, 38, 43; 5) definite time to 
respond before action taken, RORY'S BRIEF, p. 16; 6) 
identification and explanation of evidence against: RORY, RORY'S 
BRIEF, p. 9, 19-20, 33-34; 7) opportunity to prepare defense of 
allegations, RORY'S BRIEF, p. 22; 8) separate opportunity to be 
heard in mitigati .MM: : - F\ , 25-2 6, 
34-42; Oral Argument Transcript ("TRANSCRIPT" , 93 8 at pp. 9, 
29; 9) right to confront accusers, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 24, 33-34, 
36; TRANSCRIPT equiring GROVER to provide 
all evidence, including names of individuals providing evidence 
and statements, to RORY and parents, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 20, 24, 
34; TRANSCRIPT mpartial 
disciplinarian, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 28-31, 42; TRANSCRIPT, R. 938 
at p. 11; 12) presence of parents, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. i, 33, 36; 
TRANSCRIPT, represented by an 
attorney, RORY'S BRIEF, p. 37; TRANSCRIPT, 938 at p. 12; 
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14) prior to a "hearing", a warning to parents and RORY this is 
the student's only chance to tell his story and the consequences 
of not discussing the matter, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 8-9, 17, 19-21; 
TRANSCRIPT, R. 938 at pp. 7, 28; 15) information about possible 
punishments, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 8-10; TRANSCRIPT, R. 938 at p. 29; 
16) notice of right to a post-suspension parent conference, 
RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 8-10, 27; 17) advice about alternate-education 
services, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 9-10, 26, 27. 
Although RORY claimed his desire for enhanced due 
process is "still very rudimentary . . . [and] not a full blown 
trial", TRANSCRIPT, R. 938 at p. 12, the foregoing suggests 
otherwise. RORY combines, in his argument, the above under the 
headings hereinafter addressed, stating there are issues of fact 
with respect to each. 
III.A. THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A SEPARATE HEARING IN 
MITIGATION OF PUNISHMENT FOR A SUSPENSION 
OF TEN DAYS OR LESS. 
RORY argues he was entitled to two, different 
opportunities to be heard--one to be heard relative to his 
misconduct, and another to be heard in mitigation of punishment. 
RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 25-26, 39-42. RORY's position does not 
withstand scrutiny. First, Goss does not mandate a second 
hearing with respect to mitigation but rather says only one 
opportunity to be heard is required, which was afforded in this 
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case. See supra, Points I, II, pp. 15-22.13 
Second, the cases RORY cites miss the mark. For 
example, the Lamb court declares an opportunity to present an 
argument in mitigation of punishment is required only when 
expulsion is involved. 826 F.2d at 528. In fact, the Lamb court 
concluded "because Lamb was put on notice" and given an 
opportunity to present his version of the facts "before he was 
suspended . . . , the defendants cot np] :i ed w :i tl I Goss . " Id. 
Similarly, Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1975) 
mentions the right to be heard in mitigation of punishment, but 
does not identify that as a separate ai id :l i sti net opportunity to 
be heard, and again the case arises in the context of a 
suspension exceeding ten days or expulsion. Jd. at 747.14 The 
irony in RORY's position is his tui\ illingnesf * > acknowledge his 
own refusal to speak with GROVER on at least three occasions was 
the only thing that prevented his being heard on any matter, 
including n:u t:igation. 
13See also RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 17-18 (" [T]he [May 14] meeting 
was only used by Mr. Grover to ask questions about the alleged 
incident"). Indeed, RORY acknowledges receiving at least three 
opportunities to tell his story. See RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMO, pp. 3-6, UK 7.3., 7.k., R. 208-211; DISTRICT'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MEMO, ff I.H.2., I.H.4., I.J.8-10 R. 481-482, 484-485. 
14The other case RORY cites is even further off the mark. 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) deals with the right to 
be heard in the context of a parole revocation hearing and not a 
student suspension of ten days or less. 
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III.B- THIS CASE IS NOT AN UNUSUAL SITUATION 
UNDER GOSS V. LOPEZ. 
RORY argues this case is an "unusual situation" case in 
which, as the Goss court stated in dicta, "something more than 
the rudimentary procedures will be required." Goss, 419 U.S. at 
584. See RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 32, 37. RORY does not cite a case 
finding an "unusual situation,"15 but does assert this is 
"unusual" because of the alleged dual role of GROVER, RORY'S 
BRIEF, pp. 28-32, and the alleged vagueness and ambiguous 
policies of BOARD.16 RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 17, 22, 32. 
III.B.I. RORY's Impartiality Argument Lacks 
Both a Factual and Legal Basis and 
Must Therefore be Rejected. 
RORY attempts to create a due process claim and a 
disputed issue of fact by arguing he is entitled to the ENHANCED 
DUE PROCESS because GROVER was partial. RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 28-31, 
42. There are several fatal flaws to this argument. First, as 
the trial court determined, RORY did not plead this issue in his 
COMPLAINT and therefore it was not properly before the trial 
court. ORDER DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT, % III.B., R. 88 9-
15After diligent search, DISTRICT has not found an "unusual 
situation" case. 
16Contrast this to RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO in which 
RORY argued he was entitled to enhanced due process because of 
the seriousness of the charge, the INCIDENT would be on his 
record permanently, RORY's position as an honor society member 
and student-body officer, and he was excluded from Honor Society 
Dinner and other end-of-the year activities. R. 224. 
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8 90; ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, R. 8 90-891. 
Second, RORY concludes GROVER was partial because he 
was an agent of the police. However, RORY fails to establish 
this fact with any evidence. He simply jumps to the 
conclusion.17 In Lamb v. Manhandle Community Unit School 
District No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 529-530 (7th Cir. 1987), the 
plaintiff alleged defects in due process because the board's 
attorneys, the principal and the superintendent performed dual 
roles, in which all three participated in the hearing and the 
board's closed-session deliberations while plaintiff's counsel 
was excluded from deliberat " "!"!u cinn I determi ned no 
constitutional violations occurred, because there was no evidence 
of actual bias. 
Third ROR Y si lggests di le process precludes a school 
official from conducting an investigation and determining the 
punishment where criminal conduct is involved. Courts have 
clearly rejected this view, .1 Goss - • tated "Requiring 
. . . an informal give-and-take . . . will add little to the 
factfinding function where the disciplinarian himself has 
17Again RORY suggests GROVER performed two roles in this 
incident, acting both as a school official and as agent of the 
police by gathering information for law enforcement. There is no 
evidence GROVER acted in any capacity other than as the principal 
of SCHOOL. See GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 6, R. 435-436. RORY's 
position which suggests anyone who provides information to the 
police somehow becomes an agent of the police and subject to the 
same constitutional restrictions is untenable. There is no 
authority for such a proposition. 
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witnessed the conduct forming the basis for the charge." Goss, 
419 U.S. at 584. The Lamb court affirmatively declared "a school 
administrator involved in the initiation and investigation of 
charges is not thereby disqualified from conducting a hearing on 
the charges" nor does such participation otherwise violate due 
process principles. 826 F.2d at 530 quoting Brewer v. Austin 
Independent School District, 779 F.2d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Baxter v. Round Lake Area School, 856 F. Supp. 438, 444 (N.D. 
111. 1994) . Here, RORY does not claim actual bias but simply 
asserts "a reasonable person would question [GROVER's] 
impartiality." RORY'S BRIEF, p. 28. RORY points only to 
GROVER's involvement in the investigation and reporting to the 
police to establish prejudice; this is clearly insufficient. 
Indeed, virtually all reported student suspension cases involve 
situations in which the "investigation" is performed by the 
disciplinarian and often such cases also involve acts for which 
the student could be charged with commission of a crime. 
Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 387 (11th Cir. 1996); See 
Baxter, 856 F. Supp. at 443; Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529-30. 
Fourth, RORY provides no authority for the proposition 
the disciplinarian must be impartial and that partiality is 
established by reporting the results of a school investigation to 
the police. RORY suggests Goss contains some impartiality 
requirement. However, scrupulous review of the case fails to 
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reveal even the mention of the word. In fact, an impartiality 
requirement only appears to rise to the level of constitutional 
concern in the context of expulsion cases, as it is only in such 
cases that it is mentioned. See Snyder v. Farnsworth, 896 F. 
Supp. 96, 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Baxter, 856 F. Supp. at 444 & n. 
12. Reporting student misconduct to the police following an 
investigation and providing the fruits of the investigation to 
police does estab] disciplinarian a,c agent I: the 
police, or he was partial or any other violation of due process. 
Arrington v. Eberhart, 920 F. Sup. 1208, 1232 (M.D. Ala. 1996); 
Breeding, 82 F.3d at "' - ' See Byrd v. Irmo High School, 
468 S.E.2d 861, 867-868 (S.*.. rjj^ In sum, RORY fails to 
provide facts to establish GROVER was anything but impartial, and 
provides no lega] authority supporting 1 i:i s position.18 
This footnote discusses the cases cited in RORY'S BRIEF, 
pp. 28-31, to support his impartiality-due process-agent of the 
police argument. RORY's cases are not 10-day suspension cases 
and simply have no application to this case. Vernonia School 
Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), involves a fourth 
amendment search and seizure challenge to random drug testing of 
student athletes. M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. 
111. 1977), is an expulsion case dealing with a challenge to an 
allegedly illegal search, which clearly holds that the standards 
generally applicable to criminal matters do not apply to searches 
in a secondary school. The court found no due process violation 
in this expulsion case, when a district had no formal guidelines 
or procedures, no clearly defined punishment in the policy, and 
no written guidelines for administrators to follow. Id. New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), People v. Dilworth, 661 
N.E.2d 310 (111. 1996), State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d. 586 (Ga. 
1975), Commonwealth v. Cass, 666 A.2d 313 (Pa. Super, Ct. 1995), 
and M.J, v. State, 399 So.2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), all 
involve criminal proceedings and challenges to searches and 
seizures conducted on school premises. Moreover, these cases 
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III.B.2. RORY's Argument that Alleged Due 
Process Violations Resulted from 
Vague and Ambiguous Policies is 
Without Merit. 
RORY's argument DISTRICT violated due process by 
failing to provide a sufficiently clear drug policy, RORY'S 
BRIEF, pp. 7-8, 17-18, 22 n.9., 32, contains numerous fatal 
flaws, each of which standing alone requires rejection of RORY's 
argument. First, as the trial court determined, RORY did not 
plead this issue in his COMPLAINT and therefore it was not 
properly before the trial court. ORDER DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, % III.B., R. 889-890, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, R. 
890-891. 
Second, and most importantly, DISTRICT'S policy is 
clear and unambiguous and was followed in this case. Contrary to 
RORY's claim that several different policies may apply, RORY'S 
BRIEF, p. 22 n.9, a clear and specific policy applied and was 
clearly indicate actions taken by school officials, even if later 
the subject of criminal proceedings, are subject to a lower 
constitutional standard than identical actions taken by police, 
in direct contradiction of the proposition for which RORY cites 
the cases. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980), and 
United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979) deal with 
the impartiality of the judge in criminal and civil cases. 
Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977) is a school 
district employee termination case in which the parties giving 
the hearing had been publicly bad mouthing the employee. 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) involves the 
question of when a wife becomes an instrument of the police for 
the purposes of the exclusionary rule relating to search and 
seizures. Gabrilowitz v. Newmon, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978) is 
a student expulsion case where criminal charges are pending at 
the time of the hearing. 
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followed. GROVER AFFIDAVIT, f 11 and Exhibit C attached thereto, 
R. 437, 463-472. That policy clearly states no student shall use 
drugs--marijuana is specifically mentioned--on any school 
sponsored or approved activity. Id. The policy states first 
time violators will be suspended for ten days and not permitted 
to participate in any extra-curricular activities. Xd. Thus, 
RORY simply fails to establish facts which suggest DISTRICT'S 
policy was not clear in this case. 
Third, courts have not applied constitutional vagueness 
doctrines to cases involving short suspensions. In Sullivan v. 
Houston Independent School Dist., 3 07 F. Silpp. 132 8 (S.D. Texas 
1969), the court held vagueness and overbreadth doctrine applied 
to standards of student conduct only in exceptional 
circumstances. Xd. at i These "fi mdamental concepts of 
constitutional law apply only to rules of student conduct the 
violation of which could result in expulsion or suspension for a 
substantial period of time. it is beyonI :iispute 
RORY was suspended for only a ten days which is a short 
suspension. Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. 
Fourth, RORY does not advance a vagueness or 
overbreadth argument that has been recognized by any court in the 
context of a 10-day suspension. DISTRICT does not dispute courts 
have, in circumstances un] ike those in the case at hand, applied 
constitutional doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth to student 
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disciplinary policies as a factor to find due process violations. 
All those cases, however, involve challenges to the wording of 
specific provisions of a specific policy that are allegedly 
unclear.19 Here, RORY does not make any such argument, and for 
good reason; DISTRICT policy at issue is crystal clear. See 
GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 11 and Exhibit C attached thereto, R. 437, 
463-472. Indeed, RORY simply attached five alleged policies to 
RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO and baldly asserted it was not known 
exactly which policy was in effect at the time of RORY's 
suspension. RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO, % 6, p. 2, R. 207; 
Exhibits for Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, la-
le, R. 233-348; RORY'S BRIEF, p. 22 n.9. The DISTRICT pointed 
out there was no citation to support this allegation, thus it 
lacked foundational support and under the rules of evidence was 
improperly before the trial court. DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING 
RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT, % I.A., R. 582-583.20 On the other 
19Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Oradell, 42 5 U.S. 
610 (1976) is about a municipal ordinance requiring advance 
notice to police before soliciting in the city. McCall v. State, 
354 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1978) is a First Amendment case. State v. 
Martinez, 538 P.2d 521 (Wash. 1975) is a criminal statute case. 
Mitchell v. King, 363 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1975) is about the vagueness 
of a statute authorizing a Board of Education to expel a student 
because there was no distinction between on and off school 
property; Bertens v. Stewart, 453 So.2d 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1984) is a state statute case. 
20In paginating the file the clerk of the trial court 
mistakenly failed to number page number 3 of DISTRICT'S MEMO 
OPPOSING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
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hand, the DISTRICT, by admissable evidence, established the only 
policy at issue was policy "FGAB". GROVER AFFIDAVIT, 1 11, R. 
437, 463-472. 
Fifth, courts do not intermix compliance with policies 
and procedural due process violations. It is only when a 
disregard for a policy results in a procedure which itself 
impinges on due process that a due process violation occurs. 
Goodrich v. Newport News School Board, 743 P.2d 225 (4th Cir. 
1984); Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976); Hartfield 
v. East Grand Rapids Public Schools, 960 F. Supp. 1259, 1263 
(W.D. Mich. 1997). 
Finally, even assuming the constitutional vagueness 
requirements could apply in this context, they have been met in 
this case. Courts have held without exception t.-..:_ "school 
disciplinary regulations need not be drawn with the same 
precision as a criminal statute." Weimerslage v. Maine Township 
H i g h S c h o o l D i s t . , 8fM I . nUpp I .( I I Ill M l l l 1 9 l ^ i ; 
Sullivan, 307 F. Supp. at ±JM4. To satisfy due process, school 
rules need only "reasonably inform the student what specific 
conduct is prescribed." See Sullivan, 3 07 F. Supp. at 1344. 
Given this standard, RORY's claim fails. RORY does not and 
cannot claim, and identifies no facts showing DISTRICT'S drug 
policy did not reasonably apprise hini * conduct was 
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prohibited.21 To prevail on this claim RORY would have to show 
he did not know DISTRICT policy precluded the use of drugs on a 
band trip--this position borders on the preposterous. 
III.C. THERE IS NO NEED TO APPLY A BALANCING TEST 
IN THIS CASE. 
RORY urges this court to expand Goss because Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, (1976) imposed an additional three-prong 
balancing test. RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 15, 18-19, 23, 33-34, 37; 
TRANSCRIPT, R. 938 at p. 26. This suggestion to follow Mathews, 
and a host of cases in other contexts,22 is an invitation to err. 
21The facts of record are to the contrary. First, it is 
clear DISTRICT policy clearly identifies the conduct that is 
proscribed. GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 11 and Exhibit C attached 
thereto, R. 437, 463-472. Moreover, the student handbook, 
attached as Exhibit Id to RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO, was 
distributed to every student and indicates drug use is prohibited 
and it could result in suspension or expulsion. See GROVER 
AFFIDAVIT, % 7 and Exhibit B attached thereto, R. 436, 449-462. 
In addition, the handbook, including the drug related policy, was 
explained to all students, including RORY, by advisors at the 
beginning of the school year. Jd. As an informal or even oral 
rule does not violate due process as long as it fairly apprises a 
student of the conduct that is proscribed, it is clear DISTRICT'S 
policies have no constitutional defect in this case. See New 
Braunfels Indep. School Dist. v. Armke, 658 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. 
App. 10th Dist. 1983). 
22While purporting to aid the court in defining the due 
process required in this case, RORY ignores cases dealing 
expressly with student suspensions of ten days or less and 
focuses instead on cases discussing due process in entirely 
different contexts. For example, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323, 
defines the process due an individual being denied social 
security disability benefits. Courts have expressly "decline[d] 
the invitation to apply the Mathews balancing test" in a ten day 
drug suspension case. Paredes, 864 F.2d at 428-29. Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) deals with 
the due process the law requires be provided to beneficiaries of 
trust fund before they can be deprived of property in the trust. 
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RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 33-35. A review of case law, and specifically 
Mathews, establishes the "balancing test" existed long before 
Goss and Mathews were decided. Morrissev v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cafeteria workers v. McElroy, 367 
U.S. 886 (1961) In Mathews the Supreme Court said, "More 
precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of 
the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
consideration of distinct factors.' The court then lists the 
three-prong balancing test RORY advocates. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 
334-335 (emphasis added) Ii i Gos s the Court expressly applied 
the balancing test. Goss, 419 U.S. at 579-584. The Court 
[S]tudents facing suspension . . . must be given 
some kind of notice and afforded some kind of 
hearing . . . [T] he timing and content of the notice 
and the nature of the hearing will depend on 
appropriate accommodations of the competing 
interests involved. The student's interest is to 
avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion from the 
educational process, with all of its unfortunate 
consequences. The Due Process Clause will not 
shield him from suspensions properly imposed . . . 
The risk of error is not at all trivial, and it 
should be guarded against if that may be done 
without prohibitive cost or interference with the 
educational process The difficulty is that 
our schools are vast and complex. Some modicum of 
discipline and order is essential if the educational 
function is to be performed. Events calling for 
discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes 
require immediate, effective action. Suspension is 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S . 54b (196b) , :i i ivolved tl le cii le process 
required to terminate a parent's rights. 
35 
considered not only to be a necessary tool to 
maintain order but a valuable educational device. 
The prospect of imposing elaborate hearing 
requirements in every suspension case is viewed with 
great concern . . . . 
Goss, 419 U.S. at 579-580 (emphasis original). 
After identifying and balancing the competing interests 
the Court set forth what due process is required: 
[D]ue process requires, in connection with a 
suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be 
given oral or written notice of the charges against 
him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the 
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to 
present his side of the story . . . There need be 
no delay between the time notice is given and the 
time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases 
the disciplinarian may informally discuss the 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after 
it has occurred. 
Id. at 581-582 (emphasis added). 
The court rejected the call for more formalized 
procedures for suspensions of ten days or less. The court 
concluded: 
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause 
to require that hearings in connection with short 
suspensions must afford the student the opportunity 
to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own 
witness to verify his version of the incident . . 
[t]o impose in each such case even truncated 
trial-type procedures might well overwhelm 
administrative facilities in many places and by 
diverting resources, cost more than it would save 
in educational effectiveness, . . . [and make 
suspensions] too costly as a regular disciplinary 
tool and destroy its effectiveness as a part of the 
teaching process. 
Id. at 583. 
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The balancing test, contrary to RORY's assertion, was 
not new to Mathews. Goss applied the balancing test 
announcing what due process requires for a ten day suspension and 
this court should, as did the trial court,23 apply the Goss 
standard. 
In addition to the reasons given in Goss for limiting 
due process requirements when a ten day suspension is involved, 
there is a pressing need, :i i 1 ti ICE • :i ntei : < E st: : f tl le orderly 
operation of a school, that educators have certainty about due 
process requirements. The flexible weighing and balancing of 
competing interests approach asserted pv24
 Wciilci result in a 
case by case evaluation in which the educator could, at best, 
only attempt to guess what a court, after the fact, would require 
for due process. 
XII.D. GOSS DOES NOT REQUIRE RORY BE PROVIDED 
WITH NOTICE OF THE RULES AND PROCEDURES, 
HOWEVER 
AND 
RORY 
PLACE OF 
WAS 
THE 
GIVEN NOTICE 
HEARING 
OF ' 
REQUIRED 
THE 
BY 
TIME 
GOSS 
RORY'S BRIEF, p. 4 '-J , cites a state statute and a 
DISTRICT policy to support ' le claim, RORY • as i lot properly 
notified of the time and place of his "hearing". While there are 
many answers to this argument, some of which are elsewhere in 
23Ruling on Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
July 1, 1997, R. 804-806; Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, R. 814-816; SUMMARY JUDGMENT, R. 88 7-
88 8; ORDER DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, R. 888-890. 
24See RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 15, 18, 33-37. 
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this brief,25 it is sufficient answer to say RORY never pled a 
claim based on violation of state statute or BOARD policy. Due 
process requirements are set forth in Goss. Those requirements 
do not include notice of rules and procedures. In fact, "There 
need be no delay between the time notice is given and the time of 
hearing." Goss 419 U.S. at 582; Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 
428 (7th Cir. 1997); Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 386 (11th 
Cir. 1996); Byrd v. Irmo High School, 468 S.E.2d 861, 867-868 
(S.C. 1996). RORY had notice of the time and place of the 
hearing as required by Goss. In fact, ROGER and RORY were 
present but failed to avail themselves of the opportunity. 
IV• RORY DID NOT PRESERVE THE HOME SCHOOLING ISSUE 
FOR APPEAL. 
Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires RORY to set forth for each issue presented for review a 
"(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved 
in the trial court; or (B) a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. 
App. P. 24 (1998). RORY argues the DISTRICT'S failure to provide 
home schooling services tainted the hearing process. RORY'S 
BRIEF, pp. 2 6-27. RORY did not allege anything relating to home 
schooling in his COMPLAINT. The only reference RORY makes to 
25See supra, pp. 15-20 for discussion on what is required; 
pp. 30-34 for discussion of relationship between procedural due 
process and policies. 
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home schooling is under the Statement of Facts section of RORY'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO. It states: "During the suspensio he 
District provided some home schooling services to the student. 
Mr. Grover indicated that he received daily reports and did not 
hear anything that caused him to believe Rory was uncooperative 
in the home schooling program RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO, p. 
8, <h 8, R. 213. RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO then fails to 
discuss, in any form, the issue of the HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM. 
RORY did not raise the HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM at the oral argument 
on April 4, 1997. Even when RORY filed the MOTION TO AMEND and 
his accompanying First Amended Complad i it t:l :i sre i s i 10 mention < 
the HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM 26 RORY will undoubtedly argue the HOME 
SCHOOLING CLAIM is just part of his due process claim as he has 
done with so many other issues. Sucl i a cl laxacterizatd oi i is • 
wrong. Once again, due process is defined in Goss and home 
schooling is not part of the definition. 
This is an issue which was ric: »t :i i I the plead ings and was 
not presented to the trial court, and RORY has not met the 
requirements for this court to review it as an issue first raised 
on appeal. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utf 
appellate court may address an issue first raised on appeal if 
appellant established the trial court committed plain error or 
26The Proposed First Amended Complaint an be found at R. 
818-823. 
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there are exceptional circumstances). For these reasons, this 
court should refuse to address the home schooling issue. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THERE WAS A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WITH RESPECT 
TO RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION DOES NOT 
MEAN THERE WAS SUCH AN ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO 
DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. 
RORY argues in his brief the trial court erred in 
granting the DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION because the court 
found there were disputed issues of fact with respect to RORY'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 41-42. This argument 
falsely assumes the facts necessary to support DISTRICT'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTION are identical to the facts necessary to support 
RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. Pursuant toU.R.C.P. 56, the 
trial court found there was undisputed evidence RORY had an 
opportunity to be heard. That supports the SUMMARY JUDGMENT. A 
different fact -- that RORY did not have an opportunity to be 
heard -- would have to be found to support a granting of RORY'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. The trial court found there was 
disputed evidence on this point. Since there was admissible 
evidence RORY did have opportunity, which was undisputed, the 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was proper. Since there was disputed evidence 
RORY did not have an opportunity, the ORDER DENYING RORY'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION was also proper. In one case there was 
no genuine factual issue. In the other there was. SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, % II., R. 887-888; ORDER DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY 
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JUDGMENT MOTION, % III., R. 888-890. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED RORY'S MOTION 
TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF LYMAN GROVER. 
RORY argues GROVER AFFIDAVIT contradicts the GROVER 
DEPOSITION about: a) the meeting on May 16, 1996 between GROVER 
and ROGER, and b) the alleged dual role GROVER played as 
disciplinarian and a law enforcement agent. 
The trial court found no inconsistency. ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO STRIKE, pp. 8-9, R. 891-892. Regarding the meeting on 
May 16, 1996, the GROVER AFFIDAVIT and GROVER DEPOSITION state on 
several occasions GROVER invited ROGER into his private office to 
discuss the suspension but ROGER was unwilling to discuss the 
matter with GROVER and only wanted to pick RORY up and leave. 
GROVER DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 40-42; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 13, 
R. 437-438.27 
On the issue of police involvement both indicate: 1) 
GROVER recognized from the beginning the conduct of RORY was 
criminal and GROVER would be required to notify the police, 2) 
the first contact with police was May 16, 1996, 3) GROVER 
provided FILLFRED an explanation of what GROVER knew about the 
INCIDENT, and 4) GROVER called the students involved in the 
INCIDENT to his office and informed them the police had been 
notified and that was the reason for the presence of FILLFRED. 
27The original GROVER AFFIDAVIT is found at R. 433-472. The 
affidavit at R. 513-519 is a copy. 
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GROVER DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 53-56; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, Hf 6, 
9, R. 435-437.28 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING RORY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN 
AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the MOTION TO AMEND in which RORY asserted the NEW CLAIMS. RORY 
argues otherwise and makes three arguments. First, "the Amended 
Complaint presented no new causes of action". RORY'S BRIEF, p. 
45. Second, Rule 15(a) of the U.R.C.P. allows amendment of a 
complaint when justice requires. RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 46-49. 
Third, Rule 15(b) of U.R.C.P. allows amendments after trials to 
conform the pleadings to the evidence. RORY'S BRIEF, p.46. 
RORY's arguments must fail. 
VILA. RORY'S MOTION TO AMEND ATTEMPTED TO ADD 
NEW CLAIMS AND ISSUES. 
RORY's characterization of his amendment defies 
reality. If RORY's characterization is correct, there was no 
reason to file RORY'S MOTION TO AMEND since a party does not need 
to amend his complaint to simply allege additional facts. The 
trial court recognized the true character of RORY'S MOTION TO 
AMEND when it stated: 
The Court rejects [RORY's] characterization of 
the proposed amendments as merely setting forth 
28Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
to Strike the Affidavit of Lyman Grover, R. 782-792, sets forth, 
side by side, for easy comparison, the testimony of which RORY 
complains. 
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facts learned in the discovery process. The 
proposed FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT sets forth new 
issues (not new discovered facts as [RORY] asserts) 
to which [DISTRICT] would be entitled to respond, 
conduct discovery and file dispositive motions which 
would result in a delay of the final resolution of 
this matter. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, 1 2, R. 891. (emphasis added). 
In this case RORY alleged the ORIGINAL CLAIM. 
COMPLAINT, H 11, R. 3. The COMPLAINT did not contain the NEW 
CLAIMS and the trial court correctly denied RORY's efforts to 
expand the issues. Mitchell v. Palmer, 240 P.2d 970 (Utah 1952) 
(prohibiting arguing grounds and issues not pled). The NEW 
CLAIMS were raised for the first time in RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMO and, when the DISTRICT objected, then in the Proposed First 
Amended Complaint. RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO, pp. 14-15, 21-
25, R. 219-220, 226-230; DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING RORY'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, pp. 12-14, R. 591-593; Proposed First Amended 
Complaint, R. 818-823. RORY recognized his dilemma and sought to 
characterize his amendment as something other than what it was--a 
radical expansion of this lawsuit.29 
VII.B. RORY FAILS TO MEET THE STANDARD OF 
U.R.C.P. 15(a). 
In Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 
1992) this court limited the "liberal constrution" of U.R.C.P. 
29Early on the court limited the scope of the discovery 
sought by RORY in this lawsuit to the issue pled in the 
COMPLAINT. See PROTECTIVE ORDER NO. 1, R. 163-170. 
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15(a) when it stated "Utah courts should consider the following 
factors in determining whether to allow amendment: (1) the 
timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and 
(3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party." Id. at 
253. Because RORY did not meet all three-prongs, RORY'S MOTION 
TO AMEND was properly denied. 
VII.B.I. RORY's Motion for Leave to File 
an Amended Complaint was Untimely. 
In Swift Stop, in upholding the denial of Swift Stop's 
motion to amend, the Court stated, 
Utah Appellate courts uphold a trial court's denial 
of a motion to amend if the amendment is sought late 
in the course of litigation . . . Wight had already 
completed his discovery and submitted his motion for 
summary judgment when Swift Stop submitted its 
motion to amend. Therefore we find the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion 
to amend." 
Id. at 253-254. RORY claims he did not delay and attempts to 
brush Swift Stop aside because the party attempted "to add new 
claims 18 months after filing the initial complaint." RORY'S 
BRIEF, p. 46, n. 26, 48. (emphasis original). The lapse of time 
since filing the complaint is not the sole consideration. Rather 
the time period at which the amendment is sought in relation to 
the course of the litigation is important. See Westley v. 
Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (1983) (upholding 
trial court's denial of motion to amend because it would have 
delayed the trial). In this case, the trial court found the 
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MOTION TO AMEND was "untimely because it was filed approximately 
2M months after the discovery cutoff deadline, both parties had 
completed extensive discovery, and both parties had filed motions 
for summary judgment". ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, f 
III.A.l., R. 890-891. 
VII.B.2. RORY Provides No Justification 
for Delay. 
The second prong of Swift Stop required RORY to justify 
the delay. A denial of a motion to amend is appropriate "if the 
movant was aware of the facts underlying the proposed amendment 
long before its filing, and if there is no adequate explanation 
for the delay." Swift Stop, 845 P.2d at 253 (emphasis added). 
In this case RORY made no effort to explain his delay. RORY was 
aware of the "new facts" long before RORY'S MOTION TO AMEND was 
filed.30 In addition, RORY's counsel was provided with access to 
the current policies and procedures of the BOARD and the extent 
of the involvement of the law enforcement agency early in 
discovery. See DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING MOTION TO AMEND, HH 
I.D.-I.E., R. 758-759. 
30This is evident by the fact RORY admits he denied the 
charges, through ROGER, on May 13, 1996, See RORY'S MEMO OPPOSING 
DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT, % 7, p. 4, R. 700, the suspension 
notice identified the grounds, and he filed the COMPLAINT the day 
after the suspension. The COMPLAINT alleges "The basis for the 
suspension was Plaintiff's alleged possession of and/or use of 
marijuana during student activity." COMPLAINT, % 8, R. 2-3. 
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Even in the light most favorable to RORY he knew of the 
new issues no later than December 17, 1996, when he took GROVER's 
deposition. At this time RORY knew discovery cutoff was December 
27, 1996, the disposition motion deadline was January 31, 1997, 
and trial was March 18-19, 1997, SCHEDULING ORDER, R. 159-160, 
and yet he made no effort to file the MOTION TO AMEND until March 
6, 1997. RORY failed the second-prong of the test. 
VII.B.3. DISTRICT Would Be Prejudiced By 
Allowing RORY To Amend His 
COMPLAINT. 
The trial court found the DISTRICT would suffer grave 
injustice and prejudice if RORY was allowed to amend his 
COMPLAINT. The trial court stated, 
Allowing [RORY] to file the FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
would prejudice the [DISTRICT] in that [DISTRICT] 
would incur additional expense in investments of 
time and resources to respond to and conduct 
discovery on the new allegations contained in the 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, all of which could have 
been avoided if [RORY'S MOTION TO AMEND] had been 
timely filed. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, % IV.A.3., p. 8, R. 891. 
RORY contends the DISTRICT would not have suffered any 
prejudice because the "issues raised in the amended complaint 
were apparent from the discovery, particularly from the 
deposition testimony." RORY'S BRIEF, p. 48. This is a novel 
argument. RORY apparently believes because the GROVER DEPOSITION 
included mostly irrelevant and immaterial matters in relationship 
to the ORIGINAL CLAIM, the DISTRICT was on notice of the NEW 
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CLAIMS and under an affirmative obligation to read RORY's mind as 
what he intended to do with the "new facts", and prepare the 
appropriate defense and RORY was entitled to try any issue to 
which the fact may apply even if not pled. The trial court 
refused, as should this court, to impose such a novel requirement 
on a party to litigation. 
VII.C. RULE 15(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
RORY argues since U.R.C.P. 15(b) allows complaints to 
be amended even after trial to conform to evidence, the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the MOTION TO AMEND. 
RORY'S BRIEF, p. 46. There are two main flaws to this argument. 
First, the MOTION TO AMEND was filed before trial, not after. 
Second, U.R.C.P. 15(b) allows amendments to conform to the 
evidence "when issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties." U.R.C.P. 15(b) 
(1998). In this case DISTRICT has never consented, expressly or 
implied, to the trial of issues not raised in the pleadings. 
DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING MOTION TO AMEND, R. 756-779; DISTRICT'S 
MEMO OPPOSING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT, % II.B., R. 591-594. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court of San Juan County, State of Utah, should 
be affirmed. 
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